STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

INTEGRATING THE "TDA ARMY" INTO THE "TOTAL ARMY"

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ABSTRACT

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To meet today's full spectrum of mission requirements, the Army must maintain a broad range of land-force capabilities to support US joint commands and coalitions around the world. In consolidating its resources, the Army has failed to recognize, understand, and integrate a major portion of the force, its Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) structure. Focusing primarily on the lack of management and control of TDA organizations, this paper identifies weaknesses in the current method of accounting for these units, reviews initiatives designed to improve control and accountability of these units, and provides arguments in support of centralized management of TDA structure. Highlights of Total Army Analysis 2007 changes are used as a springboard for recommended future changes that will better integrate TDA organizations into the TOTAL Army to meet the Nation's needs in the 21st Century and beyond.

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INTEGRATING THE "TDA ARMY" INTO THE "TOTAL ARMY"

Congress has given the Army the mission of recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, maintaining, repairing military equipment and acquiring and maintaining real property for Army forces to comply with section 3062, Title 10 (Armed Forces), United States Code (10USC 3062) which states:

> "It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army this is capable in conjunction with the other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace and security of the United States, supporting the national policies, implementing the national objectives, and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. The Army shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war."[1]

As the Army moves into the 21st century, it faces unprecedented challenges. The events of the past decade have irrevocably changed the way the Army does business. We have moved from a large, threat based force to a much smaller, capabilities based force. Changing strategic tempo, the need for new tactical, operational and strategic capabilities, downsizing the force structure, severe fiscal constraints,

introduction of new warfighting capabilities are but a few of the changes the Army must now face.[2]

To meet today's full spectrum of mission requirements, the Army must maintain a broad range of land-force capabilities to support US joint commands and coalitions around the world. It must maintain the flexibility to adapt its structure and internal systems and subsystems as changes in national and military strategy occur. Based on our national interests and strategy, the Army must plan and design a flexible, capabilities-designed force, able to task organize and rapidly adjust to a wide variety of new, complex missions.

In designing this force for the future, the Army must better integrate its limited resources. Over the past decade, much has been done to better integrate and prepare Active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units. However, in consolidating its resources, the Army has failed to recognize, understand, and integrate a major portion of the force, its Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) structure. TDA units, which historically have belonged to individual MACOMS, represent approximately half of the Army's force structure, nearly 809,000 spaces.[3] Total Army TDA spaces are identified by core process on page 19 of this paper. These TDA requirements cross all components of the Army as they include Active Army, National

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Guard, and Army Reserve military spaces as well as Department of Army civilians, and contractor man-year equivalents.

Central management of the Army's Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) structure would improve the Army's ability to support national and military strategy. This paper examines the current Army structure and how it is resourced. Focusing primarily on Table of Distribution and Allowance organizations, this paper discusses weaknesses in the current method of accounting for these units, and reviews initiatives designed to improve control and accountability of TDA units. As a method of accounting for Army missions accomplished with the aid of civilian contracted support, contracted man-year equivalents are incorporated into this paper as part of the Army TDA structure.

BACKGROUND

Within the Army charter set by Congress, the Army has two distinct roles, that of an institution, and that of an organization. The institutional role focuses on the Army's essence, traditions, lineage, and history. This includes missions involving recruitment, doctrine development, training, leader development, and responsiveness to the nation's needs. The organizational role focuses on the total military structure, active and reserve component, and the civilian and contracted man-year requirements that make up the Army's total force

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structure. The successful integration of these two Army roles

requires the synchronization of many Army functional systems and

the involvement and coordination of multiple levels of command.

This is not a simple task, and its difficulty is compounded by

the fact that the Army operates under a duel requirements

determination and documentation system.

Historically, Modified Table of Organization and Equipment

(MTOE) documents are used to authorize units that directly

support the war fight and Table of Distribution and Allowances

(TDA) documents are used for non-deployable units that generally

fulfill mission functions and workload obligations. However, as

the Army has downsized and missions have changed, more and more

mission integration has occurred among TDA and MTOE units.

Authorization documents provide the organizational structure

against which units are organized. There are five types of

authorization documents, Modified Tables of Authorization and

Equipment, (MTOE), Table of Distribution and Allowances, (TDA),

Augmentation TDA (AUGTDA), Full Time Support TDA (FTSTDA, and

Mobilization TDA (MOBTDA. Doctrinally AUGTDAs, FTSTDAs, and

MOBTDAs augment existing MTOEs or TDAs. The remainder of this

paper will focus on the two primary categories of authorization

documents, MTOEs and TDAs.

MTOEs are the authorization documents used for units that

have a primary warfighting mission. They are a modification of

a TOE which is the HQDA-approved standardized document that reflects the personnel and equipment requirements needed to accomplish a stated mission of combat, combat support or combat service support. It is DA policy that any deviation from the TOE and applicable integrated change packages and basis of issue plans requires HQDA approval for an exception to MTOE standardization.[4] MTOE development is a lengthy process that takes from five to seven years.[5]

A TDA prescribes the organizational structure for an organization or activity with a mission or function for which a TOE does not exist, and may include civilian positions. TDAs are designed to attain the most efficient use of personnel and the most effective operational capability within the manpower spaces prescribed in the command force structure. They are normally used to accomplish specific force generating missions and functions. AR 71-32, Force Development and Documentation—Consolidated Policies, states that "TDA units are generally nondeployable units organized to fulfill mission functions and workload obligations of a fixed support establishment in CONUS or overseas."[6] TDA organizations are designed in a manner that allows them to be changed as the requirements for their support change. It takes 18 months to three years to change a TDA.[7]

While both MTOE and TDA roles are important to maintaining a strategic force today and in the future, it is the

"organization" role, the missions traditionally performed by MTOE units, that people see both home and abroad. These have always been perceived as the fighting forces. However, times and missions have changed. Today, TDA units are often involved in missions that were once perceived as MTOE only missions. Today, both MTOE and TDA units' roles and missions must be reviewed, quantified, and modernized if our force is to be relevant and meet the needs of our changing world. In this area, the Army has fallen short.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has the mission of determining Army doctrine and warfighting requirements. "TRADOC is the Army's war-fighting requirements "gatekeeper" and acts as the primary combat developer in the domains of doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel, focused on the soldier (DTLOMS)."[8] In performing this mission, TRADOC's primary focus has been the MTOE Army, our warfighting force.

Throughout recent history, US Army units have trained to participate as part of a large land force, operating in a Cold War environment. Warfight planning scenarios capitalized on large numbers of forward-deployed forces in well-developed theaters. Today the Army must be prepared to respond to an increasing array of potential employments from near simultaneous

major theater wars (MTW), to any number of a variety of small-scale contingencies, (SSC).

To assist in rapidly responding to changing mission requirements and providing the right size and capability, the Army has "modularized" MTOE units at echelons above division level. Internal organizational capabilities are grouped to accomplish specific tasks. Placing these capabilities within paragraphs of a MTOE facilitates effective packaging of Army forces for SSC operations. These modularized paragraphs or unit elements replicate, increment, or vary functional capabilities of the parent unit. They assist the Army in "task organizing" it's units and provide the supported CINC with a force that is interchangeable, expandable, and tailorable to meet changing missions and needs.[9]

Task organizing accomplishes three primary tasks. First, as a primarily continental United States (CONUS)-based force, it allows the Army to rapidly project a tailored force to meet military missions. Second, it provides the best use of limited airlift and sealift assets, and finally, task organization assists in managing in-country/in-theater military personnel restrictions/limitations.

CURRENT SITUATION

During the past decade, based on Congressional direction and DOD guidance, the Active Army will have declined from a military strength of 781,000 to 480,000 soldiers, a 38% decrease. During this same period the National Guard has faced a 23% reduction in end strength, 457,000 to 329,000, while the Army Reserve reduced it's strength by 36%, from 319,000 to 201,000.[10] By 2005, the civilian workforce is projected to be 218,000, an overall reduction of 46%.[11]

As we continue to downsize and realign Army structure to meet Title 10 and strategic requirements, the Army must overcome several perceptions and internal problems concerning how we structure and account for our forces. The following paragraphs highlight major areas that need to be addressed and discuss possible changes that would enhance current structuring methods.

One of the first obstacles to be overcome is the perception that TDA organizations both internal and external to the Army are administrative overhead and do not contribute to the Army's strategic mission. This common misconception comes from our duel structuring process that focuses priority on the war fighting force. Unfortunately, not only some members of Congress hold this misconception, but so do personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and among the senior Army leadership. They visualize TDA structure in light of what it

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previously was, when the Army was larger and focused on a global threat. They saw and some still see TDAs as administrative, non-deploying "overhead". This perception highlighted in daily planning as well as the disproportional salami-slice cuts taken by TDA organizations through the TAA process over the past decade needs to change.

Today many TDA units are an integral part of our force projection Army. If forces were to mobilize and deploy tomorrow, 15.1% of the Active Army's military structure would be employed/deployed as TDA, Force Package 1 Units.[12] Additionally, approximately 9,800 Army Reserve soldiers occupying nearly 16% of its 62,000 TDA spaces would be immediately mobilized and employed.[13]

TDA structure, including contracted man-years represents 50% of the total Army force structure. The mere size of the TDA force justifies controlling these resources at DA vice MACOM level. If these spaces are critical to the Army's mission, they must be managed, supported, and defended by the Army's force integrator, DA, DCSOPS.

Support for the Army's requirements determination process needs to be strengthened. In attempting to keep pace with the rapidity of change in the world, the process of determining requirements has become fractious. The old, linear system of developing requirements and then applying them in a step by step

process is too slow to meet today's timelines for change. Today, while TRADOC is developing modular organizations for Force XXI and the Army After Next, agencies outside of TRADOC are developing non-system training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators and passing them directly to Department of Army with out TRADOC's knowledge. This has resulted in materiel capabilities being developed through the technology base without a defined operational requirement.

This problem was partially addressed in March 1996, when DA directed all potential Army requirements be passed through TRADOC for validation. Progress has been made, but there is still a long way to go. As long as TDA units are under MACOM vice DA control, there will continue to be problems in this area.

The "TDA Army" is responsible for generating forces. TDA units and contracted man-years represent half of the Total Army's force structure. TDA spaces are divided among military components, Department of the Army civilians and contractor man-years as shown in the following chart.

MILITARY	NUMBER OF SPACES	TOTAL
ACTIVE COMPONENT	126,000	126,000
TTHS ACCOUNT	63,000	189,000
JOINT/DOD	10,000	199,000
NATIONAL GUARD	35,OOO	234,000
ARMY RESERVE	62,OOO	296,000
CIVILIANS	238,000	534,OOO
CONTRACTOR MAN YRS	275,000	809,000

Table 1 Total Army TDA Structure[14] 1

These Active Army positions, Joint/DOD positions and
soldiers in the TTHS account equate to over forty percent of the
active Army military spaces. Looking at Army structure in this
light makes it easier to understand why Congress and OSD feel
the Army has too much military structure. The Army's inability
to articulate and quantify what these TDA units do results in
Department of Defense and congressional leadership questioning
our need for the structure we have. Not understanding the
structure, they believe that if the Army is willing to place 40%
of its active military structure in TDA/administrative overhead
positions, that most of this structure should be eliminated, or
outsourced. Within the Army this TDA investment points out that
at any point in time, over 40% of the Active Army structure is
not accounted for as part of the Army's workload, nor is it
directly supported by Army Doctrine and force integration

policies. This again leads to the question as to whether the structure is needed or if some TDA spaces could be transferred to improve mission capabilities of MTOE units.

TDA units and their mission must be explained and quantified or the Army risks losing the spaces. Centralized documentation, controlled at Department of Army level would help the Army to control its own destiny in regards to these spaces.

Another problem generated by the way our TDA structure is managed concerns the application of Army Management Structure Codes, AMSCOs and Management Decision Packages, MDEPs. AMSCOs and MDEPs are the primary methods used by TRADOC and Department of Army to identify and tie training requirements to equipment authorizations and both of these to units. Application of these codes for MTOE units is standardized. Using these codes for TDA organizations is a nightmare because of the lack of doctrine and therefore the lack of consistency between MACOMs on how they apply AMSCOs and MDEPs for their TDA organizations. As an example, the resource requirements for a civilian personnel shop at a training installation might be categorized under a training AMSCO (because it supports the training mission). The same type of shop's resource requirements (in terms of mission and function) at a depot might be categorized under sustain/maintain or store because of where the shop is located. Ideally, under a centralized accounting system, both organizations would code

their requirements as "administrative support" or some other doctrinally developed category.

This is yet another reason for centralizing control of TDA structure at the Department of Army level. Centralizing control of TDA structure would result in doctrine development and the standardization needed to tie resources, requirements and units together.

Our current method of determining the Department of Army Master Priority List, (DAMPL) is another area that does not properly address or prioritize TDA requirements. The DAMPL provides the standing order of precedence list approved by the senior Army leadership to guide the distribution of personnel and equipment resources used or controlled by the Department of Army. The DAMPL, by design, is intended to reflect each claimant's strategic priority in support of military strategies and is sequenced in support of CINC OPLANS. The DAMPL does not prioritize units based on their OPTEMPO in support of operations other than war and/or Small Scale Contingencies for which there are not OPLANS or CONPLANS.

In today's environment this method of determining priorities is somewhat archaic. The Army, in support of our national interests and our national military strategy, is constantly involved in small-scale contingency operations for which there is no existing OPLANS or CONPLANS; plans are built

as needed. Additionally, strategic assessments show that the United States is not likely to face a peer competitor for the next 15-20 years.

Methods for determining unit DAMPLs need to be brought more in line with national interests and National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives. Currently we have two NMS objectives. They are to promote peace and stability and to defeat adversaries in the event of an armed conflict. In today's environment with no peer competitor, the Army's objective should be to promote peace and stability while maintaining the capability to defeat potential adversaries. Using this logic, participating in SSC operations, as directed by the National Command Authority should be the basis for DAMPLing units.

A final recommendation for the DAMPLing process is to incorporate DAMPL determination as part of the TAA process. The warfight modeling done by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), in support of the TAA process, is based on the National Military Strategy and the force structure through the POM years. CAA models include MTWs as well as a variety of SSC operations. Incorporating the DAMPL process would better align personnel, equipment, and resource requirements.

The lack of doctrine and training package support for TDA units is another total force integration problem. For years the doctrinal and training development functions, done in TRADOC,

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focused almost exclusively on the MTOE Army. TDA units/requirements were not ignored, but were not <u>doctrinally</u> based. TRADOC, the Army's proponent for doctrine, provides doctrinally based reference materials and training systems for the war fighting Army, the MTOE Army. School quotas, force integration policies, ARTEPs, force modernization designs and training programs are designed, prioritized and focused on MTOE force requirements. Since TDA units are not doctrinally based war fight units, their respective MACOM's provide training support. However, as times have changed, so have TDA units/missions. Not all TDA units support the Army or Army MACOMs. Some of the Army's TDA structure supports the National Command Authority and Joint Service requirements. Other TDA structure serves as key elements in force projection, deployment and redeployment. As we come to depend upon these units more and more, it is important that they receive better support and emphasis on doctrine and training.

TDA structure represents nearly half of the Army's force structure. Military, civilian and contractors need to train together as we move into the 21st century. We need to develop doctrine and training support systems that will make TDA units a "capability" and not "overhead".

Technological changes are another reason TDA units must be integrated into the Total Force. As we have moved to a smaller

more technology-based force, there has been a need for MTOE units to operate using systems developed by TDA organizations. Many of these systems, originally designed for just the TDA organization, were not processed through TRADOC's requirements determination process. As an example, since 1989, DA has designated Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC); a TDA organization not aligned with TRADOC, as the system developer for eight DOD migration systems. Since MTMC has not been part of the materiel development process in the past, requirements were passed directly from MTMC to DA. DA allocated funding to MTMC who in turn fielded equipment to MTOE units in a "stovepiped" fashion. It resulted in equipment being fielded outside the Army's fielding process and without doctrinally established requirements.

Again, the new requirements determination process established by TRADOC in March 1996, has helped eliminate some of these problems. However, TDA organizations are not controlled by doctrine and as such, continue to develop "systems" to assist them in their missions. Bringing TDA units under DA control would alleviate this problem.

A final area to be addressed is the Army's method of managing change. Managing change within the Army is the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, specifically, the force development and integration

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division, DAMO-FDF. To successfully manage change and balance the requirements for change with readiness, DA and TRADOC employ several over watch processes. These force development and force integration processes such as the Force Design Updates, Branch Functional Area Assessments, and Functional Reviews as well as most force modernization processes focus on the MTOE force and have not in the past properly addressed TDA requirements. Responsibility to ensure that TDA requirements were identified has been a MACOM responsibility. Ultimately, this resulted in resource shortfalls such as incorrect equipment requirements being placed in the POM and insufficient training seats allocated at TRADOC schools. The end result is an inaccurate picture of resource requirements in the areas of finance, equipment, personnel, and training.

Decisions to change MTOE units are made through a logical, structured force development process. This is not true for TDA units. They are changed based on MACOM requests and space availability. The Army can not afford to allow half of its assets to be controlled in this manner. It is time for TDA requirements to go through a similar process and compete for resourcing based on total Army requirements.

For the past seven to ten years, the Army has realized is does not have a viable TDA requirements determination process. To help quantify and explain its TDA force requirements, the

Army began developing a method for accounting for TDA authorizations during TAA-01. Each TAA cycle since TAA-01 has added additional TDA reporting requirements in an attempt to gain better oversight of TDA structure. However, progress has been too slow. Over the past four years, the lack of an analytical basis for the resources that are applied against infrastructure requirements has increased pressure from Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to reduce Army end strength. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the current Defense Reorganization Initiative Directive 20 (DRID-20) recommend significant cuts in Army structure based on our inability to define and quantify our TDA structure.

TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS 2007, TAA-07

TAA-07 appears to be the first quantitative step forward in the management of TDA structure. Recognizing the fundamental weakness in the current method of determining TDA requirements and its adverse affect of force structure, DAMO-FDF is using the TAA process to quantify TDA requirements, begin linking them to POM resourcing, and incorporating them into the Army's requirements determination process.

Title 10 core processes designated in DA PAM 100-1 are being used to define and quantify TDA unit missions. These

processes and the percentage of TDA force currently aligned with each process are shown in the following charts.

CORE PROCESS	ABBR	% of TDA
Plan, Provide Direction, Obtain & Allocate Resources	PP	8.1%
Acquire, Train & Sustain People	AT	13.6%
Acquire and Sustain Infrastructure	AINF	26.7%
Operate Installations	OPI	2.6%
Acquire, Maintain & Sustain Equipment	AEQ	12.5%
Support Organizational Training	SOT	5.4%
Develop Requirements	DR/DD	0.7%
Identify & Develop Leaders	IDL	0.4%
Manage Information	MI	2.5%
Maintain & Sustain Land Operations	MLO	16.7%
Tailor, Mobilize & Support Land Power Projection; Redeploy, Refit, &/or Demobilize Forces	MOB	1.8%
Joint Augmentation/DOD Augmentation	JT	1.2%
Transients, Trainees, Holdees, & Students	TTHS	7.8%
		100.0%

Table 2 TDA Structure By Core Process

Aligning TDA units to Core Processes, is the first step in quantifying workload standards and establishing doctrine for the Army's TDA Generating forces. The next step is to crosswalk Title 10 requirements to Core Processes and link TDA requirements resourcing to the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for 2002-2007. In order to do this, TDA units have been divided in to two categories, TDA base generating forces (BGF) and TDA base engagement forces (BEF).

BGF TDA units represent the force structure necessary to provide for, access, organize, train, equip, maintain, sustain,

project, redeploy, refit, and restore Army forces and other forces as required.[15] In terms of Army missions outlined under Title 10, Defense Planning Guidance, The Army Plan, and the QDR, these TDA units are responsible to provide the force structure necessary to direct, control, and continuously plan for resources, operations, and modernization to meet present and future requirements. These forces also continuously plan for resources, operations, and modernization to meet present and future requirements. In addition to their force projection mission these units are responsible for generating a trained and ready force capable of executing national strategy and performing other missions as required.[16]

BEF TDA units are those units stationed outside the continental United states that are required to meet the continuous, long-term forward presence that shape the theater in support of U.S. national interests.[17] This consists of all TDA organizations whose mission focus is to enhance regional stability within a theater. These TDA missions include international staff, attache, security assistance, and embassy functions as well as force structure required to meet commitments in compliance with treaties; commitments for counter drug operations, and assets that execute CINC engagement plans (8th U.S. Army Headquarters).

TAA-07 is an aggressive effort to quantify and bring TDA structure under Department of Army control. Identifying and quantifying TDA units and their missions as part of the Army structuring and resourcing process is a giant leap forward. However, an even bigger challenge lies ahead...that challenge is to develop workload standards and establish doctrine for TDA units.

THE FUTURE

In developing our forces for the future, we must chart a course that is much different from the past. Our world has changed in countless ways, and we must accept and embrace these and future changes. Today our Army is a Force Projection Army largely based in the continental United States. To meet operational and strategic requirements we employ split-based methodologies, count on civilians and commercial industry, and operate as elements of Joint Task Forces and coalitions. The primary threats we face are likely to result in non-traditional types of operations. Additionally, information and technological advances will make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and forces. Multi-nationalism and routine interagency partnerships are realities. These factors, in addition to

resource constraints, require us to plan for the future based on a much more holistic vision of future war fighting.

The greatest challenge in reshaping the Total Army for the future is balancing today's readiness and tomorrow's modernization requirements with all the resources available.[18] Meeting this challenge will require horizontal integration. This means the application of common solutions across multiple systems to improve the capability of the total force; active, reserve, Nation Guard, civilian, and contracted services—The Total Army.

The Army, like the rest of the Armed Forces is at a strategic crossroads. We can continue on our current course—pursuing incremental improvements in capabilities, albeit in increasingly smaller packages—or we can seize the current strategic opportunity to fundamentally reshape the Army to meet the changing demands of the 21st Century.[19] What ever course is decided upon, the Army must be able to explain why the Department of Defense, Congress, and the American people should approve, authorize and appropriate funds for the Army. Total Army requirements must be linked to the Army's planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system, explaining what the Army provides to the American people: the return on their investment.[20] Centralizing control of TDA structure will be instrumental in helping the Army accomplish this mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Today our Total Army, MTOE and TDA, active and reserve, military and civilian, is actively engaged around the world and will remain engaged in the foreseeable future. Readiness of our soldiers and units is critical to shaping and responding today, while modernization is key to preparing now for an uncertain future.[21] Limited resources for a number of competing demands require tough choices as to how resources are allocated. Near term personnel, equipment, and training readiness; end strength, and force structure; quality of life programs; and modernization must all vie for steadily decreasing resources in a world of steadily increasing operational requirements and uncertainty.[22]

Because of the hectic pace of change and limited resources, the process for determining requirements can no longer be as linear as it once was. No longer do we have the luxury of implementing change one process at a time. The Army must take a holistic approach and synchronize and balance changes to its six fundamental imperatives; quality people, training, force mix, doctrine, modern equipment, and leader development. Decisions must be made concerning the types of units involved in the change process, and, at the same time leaders and troop training must begin, required equipment procured and doctrine be developed. TAA-07 initiatives are a giant step in the right direction, but there is more to be done. All Army requirements

and structure, MTOE and TDA, military, civilian, and contractor equivalent man-years must be prioritized, centrally managed, trained and resourced.

For this to happen, TDA structure must be centrally controlled and fully integrated into the total Army structure. In this paper I have addressed six perceptions or problems concerning our current method of accounting for TDA structure. They were:1) the requirements determination process, 2) the size of TDA force and the perception that TDA units are "overhead", 3) our method of applying AMSCOs and MDEPs to TDA units, 4) our method of determining units DAMPLs, 5) the lack of doctrine and training support for TDA units, and 6) the disparity in the methods we use to change MTOEs and TDAs.
Analysis of these areas has resulted in the following recommendations.

1) The Army must develop standardized rules for the development and management of TDAs without taking away the flexibility and timeliness in which TDA adjustments can be made. DA centralized documentation would alleviate most problems identified in quantifying TDA requirements. Centralizing control of TDAs at DA level would result in standardized models, workload standards and a force structure based on doctrine. With this system in place, TDA requirements could be recruited,

trained, equipped and resourced based of total Army requirements

instead of individual MACOM priorities.

2) TDA requirements must be doctrinally based so they can

compete for resourcing with MTOE unit requirements based on NMS.

3) The DAMPL determination process be aligned with NMS and

incorporated into TAA process during TAA-09.

Changes must be made to better integrate TDA units into the

total force and ensure they are resourced and trained. In

the words of General Dennis Reimer,

> "We must find smarter ways to do business,
> streamline our management process, reduce
> overhead, leverage outside resources, and use
> what we have more efficiently in order to become
> more effective." [23]

Word Count 5,641

ENDNOTES

[1] Department of the Army, <u>Force Integration</u>, Field Manual 100-11 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, January 1998), 1-1.

[2] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, <u>Requirements Determination</u>, Training Pamphlet #3 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, 1996), 2.

[3] The statistics for this paragraph are based on the statistics contained in the Department of Army DAMO-FDF Briefing, Total Army Analysis 2007; TDA in TAA 07 GOSAG II," dated 19 January 1999.

[4] Department of the Army, <u>Force Development and Documentation-Consolidated Policies</u>, Army Regulation 71-32 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 3 March 1997), 39.

[5] Foster, Bob. Interviewed by author 1 February 1999, Arlington, Virginia.

[6] Department of the Army, <u>Force Development and Documentation-Consolidated Policies</u>, Army Regulation 71-32 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 3 March 1997), 41.

[7] Foster, Bob. Interviewed by author 1 February 1999, Arlington, Virginia.

[8] Department of the Army, <u>Force Integration</u>, Field Manual 71-11 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, January 1998), 8-3.

[9] Training and Doctrine Command, <u>Concept for Modularity</u>, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-68 (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, 10 January 1995), 1-3.

[10] The statistics for this paragraph are based on the statistics contained in the Department of Army DAMO-FDF Briefing, Total Army Analysis 2007; TDA in TAA 07 GOSAG II," dated 19 January 1999.

[11] Department of Army, <u>United States Army Posture Statement, 1999</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 1998), 43.

[12] The statistics for this paragraph are based on the statistics contained in the Department of Army DAMO-FDF Brief, Total Army Analysis 2007; TDA in TAA 07 GOSAG II", dated 19 January 1999.

[13] Tate, Craig. Interviewed by author 17 February 1999, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Statistics reflect the Army Reserve's CONUS Sustaining Base TDA structure.

[14] Struder, Kurt. Interviewed by author 1 February 1999, Arlington, Virginia. Statistics compiled by DAMO-FDF and reflect FY 99 authorizations. Statistics also incorporated into DAMO-FDF TAA-07 briefing charts dated 19 January 1999.

[15] The statistics for this paragraph are based on the statistics contained in the Department of Army DAMO-FDF Brief, TDA in TAA-07, 16 October 1998.

[16] Ibid., Tab 1:36.

[17] Ibid., Tab 1:37.

[18] Department of the Army, United States Army Posture Statement FY 99 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 1998), iii.

[19] Department of Army, The Army Plan , (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, October 1998), I-1.

[20] Ibid., v.

[21] Ibid., 35.

[22] Ibid., 35.

[23] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Requirements Determination, Training Pamphlet #3 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, 1996), 20.

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